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The Meaning of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki 
This age, however long it may last, even if it 
should last forever, is the last age, for there is no 
possibility that the possibility of our self-
extermination can ever end - but by the end itself. 
Since the time of the end could turn into the end of 
time, we have to do everything to make the end of 
time endless. 
In countless acts of remembrance during its 
50th anniversary in the Summer of 1995 the world 
paid tribute to the victims of the atomic bombing 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This commemorative 
event calls upon us to look at the stark reality of 
war in terms of both aggrieved and aggriever so as 
to develop a common understanding of history in 
which is now inscribed the destiny of mankind. 
We have long retreated from the comfort of a 
confident ancient guiding through transcendent and 
divine points of reference to the modem factual 
point where we as individuals and as a species 
have begun to revolve precariously only about 
ourselves without orientation and meaning-giving 
moral principles. But how do we judge - from 
within the secular world and its seemingly 
enlightened yet disenchanted reality of history - our 
life at the cross-roads between its annihilation and 
unification? And according to what criteria of 
judgement and justification do we at all reason 
about it after having - since the dev~lopment of the 
bomb - become omnipotent and impotent at the 
same time? This is therefore the moment, if ever 
there was one, to raise again the fundamental 
questions about the meaning of humanity. 
••• 
What does it mean to be the only nation in the 
world to have been atom-bombed, to have had the 
cosmic power of the sun turned against Japan in 
anger? Many who were there in August 1945 and 
survived - know. Many of us today who also 
survived face a harder task: that of imagining and 
internalising an all-incinerating blast. It is difficult 
to manage such a mental leap from a distance in 
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time and space and to preserve in consciousness a 
sense of guilt but also vigihince against the 
summum malum we were so prone to perpetrate 
this century. In a way, though, we latter-day 
survivors the world over are immersed in what 
happened more than 50 years ago as well, for 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki have an extraordinary 
bearing on all of human existence. We are all 
survivors. We are all hibakusha. The bomb affects 
us all in our need to think adequately about its 
meaning for the present and the future to come. 
The experience of physical and spiritual 
suffering transcends our usual conceptions of 
society and history. Yet it is incumbent upon us to 
translate the suffering of the hibakusha into a 
conscientious reflection on the relationship 
between the idea of nuclear war and the moral and 
political dilemmas this very idea poses for human 
action. For if we do not make this contemplative 
effort, the idea of war may not be coherent and 
strong enough to guide us in preventing a nuclear 
war and consequently turn it into a reality. 
In this article, therefore, I wish to illuminate in 
a critical diction the vexed question of the 
responsibility of ethical thinking in the nuclear age. 
I hope thereby to complement, if only in schematic 
form, the holistic thinking as it unfolds itself in my 
book Hegelian Reflections on the Idea of Nuclear 
War. There I sought to explicate socio-historical 
dialectic and phenomenology and to delineate the 
process of their concept-formation for an 
understanding ofthe global organisation of human 
life. It is in dialectic that we find the immanent 
principle of all human social activity and 
movement, while in phenomenology the philosophy 
of SUbjectivity grounds this principle in a 
framework of consciousness, world, and history . 
And in these two cases it is conceptual pairs such 
as, for instance, subject-object, being-becoming, 
consciousness-self-consciousness, or 
understanding and reason, which connect 
otherwise isolated facts into contextual meaning. It 
is only when socio-historical relations are lived 
through in their reflexivity that we realise the need 
to respond to the threat to the sources of our 
existence and thereby become responsible for their 
protection. The book is a hermeneutic inquiry into 
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the philosophical implications of the idea of a 
nuclear holocaust. For this purpose it syste-
matically interprets the thinking of previous 
philosophers and their question of how it is 
possible for individuals to comprehend a whole of 
which they are merely a part. 
How has our understanding of the nuclear age 
changed since 1945? Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
determined the events after the Second World War 
in that they transformed from the very beginning 
the Cold War into the nuclear arms race and the 
balance of terror. The dropping of the bombs on 
Japan provided the proof that atomic weapons can 
be used, which in its consequence threatens all 
mankind in its future existence. In order to avoid 
an unparalleled catastrophe we must seek to 
combine the leap in technology with a leap in 
ethical consciousness. We must think through the 
philosophical conditions of human dignity when 
relating to others. For if we do not live up to the 
moral precepts that ought to bind us all, tragedy 
will come upon us. 
The bombs grew out of history, yet they 
threaten to end history. Hence, they are a nemesis 
of all human intentions, actions, and hopes. 
Realising that the unthinkable is thinkable, we must 
learn to conform our actions to this' truth or die. 
For this reason Hiroshima and Nagasaki are of 
fundamental historical significance. They point 
towards and are a picture of what our world is 
from now on always poised to become - a field of 
ashes without a Phoenix ever to rise again. This 
fact of evolutionary severance should humble us in 
our expectations. There is no evidence that any 
species, once extinguished, has ever evolved again. 
While death cuts off life, extinction cuts off birth. 
Being only part of life how can we at all step back 
from it and assess the disappearance of life as a 
whole? 
The origin of the peril of human extinction 
seems to lie not so much in any partiCUlar social 
and political circumstances or the conflictual 
power constellations within the system of states. 
These situations are historically contingent. While 
for the time being a nuclear threat let alone attack 
is highly improbable, no prediction is possible as to 
future conflicts whose reasons may lead to their 
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escalation into crises, and these, in turn, may cause 
the outbreak of war and the use of nuclear forces. 
Though the rise and fall of power dynamics are 
subject to constant change and geographic shifts, 
in and of themselves they do not threaten the 
human species in its survival. The danger lies 
rather in the attainment by mankind as a whole, 
and after millennia of scientific and technological 
progress, of a certain level of knowledge of the 
physical universe and in our ability to utilise its 
forces for the construction of nuclear weapons. 
This knowledge now belongs'ofnecessity to all 
places and to all times. But what we do not know 
is whether we have the psychological and 
philosophical maturity to live with the bomb for all 
eternity. 
The nuclear age is therefore incommensurable 
with all ofits antecedent history. Notions such as 
peace, freedom, and victory, when seen in global 
perspectives, have changed their meaning. In 
addition, deterrence, which is the mainstay at all 
levels of strategic relations, presupposes the 
preparedness to use the bomb as the weapon of 
last resort. But there is no guarantee that 
deterrence will always hold in all circumstances, or 
that the bomb will never be used should deterrence 
fail. With such uncertainty the question arises as to 
the mode of ethical reasoning about nuclear 
weapons once we know that the possibility of war 
is an inevitable dimension of the reality of human 
life. 
We are faced with an antinomy which cannot 
be overcome. On the one hand, there is the 
understandable argument that nuclear weapons 
should be eliminated. On the other, there is the 
fearful insight that such a goal of duty can never 
be achieved. For even if it were politically and 
technically possible to dismantle all nuclear 
weapons systems, a residuum of the knowledge of 
how to build and deploy them would always 
burden our conscience. Our reflections, then, are 
caught in the antinomy between what is and what 
ought to be. An antinomy makes a choice possible. 
But in the case of nuclear weapons, which cover 
both sides of the antinomy, we cannot decide 
between the two expectations because each option 
confronts the other with irreconcilable 
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conseqllenc~s. 
The indelible lesson of the bomb, therefore, is 
that it sharpens the scepticism about the strength 
of our moral consciousness and the very 
foundations and conditions of the ethical 
perspective of human life. This perspective has in 
the nuclear age been permanently extended from 
local to global dimensions. This situation makes it 
therefore imperative that the parameters of our 
thinking are no longer to be restrictively determined 
through political polarities. They are to be opened 
up and broadened in terms of the inescapable 
interconnectedness of international socio-historical 
phenomena whatever their ideological character. 
From this follows that the principle of part-
whole relation between individual states and 
mankind makes it furthermore necessary that 
human actions and aims are seen as legitimate only 
ifthey obey the imperative of impartiality and if the 
judgement of motivation for action is enlarged 
from the mere correctness of individual interests to 
the truth and validity of global concerns in which 
these interests are embedded. We must rise to the 
intentional consciousness that it is the whole that 
conditions and necessitates the parts and not the 
other way around. 
Earlier philosophical traditions allowed for a 
plurality of ethical systems in the cultures of the 
world because the violation of any of them in the 
past did not affect the whole of humankind. But 
the idea of pluralism makes sense only if there is a 
conceptual unity that brings the manifold kinds of 
self-expression into closer proximity to one 
another. The planetary context of nuclear arsenals 
makes it plainly paramount that we ]Jecome and 
remain forever sensitive to the need of an 
integrative ethics. We cannot content ourselves 
with mere pluralism in the light of possible 
wholesale destruction. What, then, are the origin 
and categorical conditions of a universal ethics? 
To begin with, the principle of utilitarianism in 
international relations and the imposition of 
individual state interests even in the 'name of 
deterrence are conceptually one-sided and hence 
do not fulfil the criteria of ethical considerations 
commensurate with the human predicament. The 
will towards holistic political reason must instead 
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recognise the duty to reflect upon international 
relations in the context oftfieir global implications. 
Such reflections alone perhaps can effect the 
overcoming in practical terms of the self-interest 
of states and their right to self-defence. The right 
to defend oneself does not justifY the escalation of 
a war of defence into a war of a nuclear offence 
against humanity. It does not justifY the risk of 
annihilation. In other words, the principles of just 
and unjust wars need to be examined from the 
point of view of their moral and legal validity when 
applied to the question of what is at stake in the 
nuclear age. Philosophical reflection leads clearly to 
the insight that the right of a part does not 
constitute a right against the whole which already 
for logical reasons underlies it as its very 
presupposition. Accordingly, the ethical standpoint 
of humanity is the only adequate standpoint ofa 
substantive critique which suspends all world-
immanent decisions. 
At the same time we must also recognise that 
both the scientific knowledge of nuclear processes 
and the historical availability of nuclear weapons 
are irrevocable. Hence, it is meaningless in the 
strict sense to assume that we can ever live in a 
nuclear-free world. We are intellectually entitled to 
seek to understand the laws of nature out of which 
we have evolved historically. In fact, a ban against 
the bomb may even amount to a verdict against 
nature and history alike in which after all the 
rationality of man was once set free. This 
rationality, though, we can employ in a regulative 
and caring or in a dogmatic and subversive way. It 
may guide us towards making political judgements 
with caution and in global perspective or mislead 
us to believing that only because we have the 
technical capability to do something we also ought 
to do it irrespective of the risk such action entails. 
The consequences of the possibility of the 
collapse of deterrence relations only once is 
disproportionate to the apparent positive result of 
such situations in the short term. But the apparent 
positive results can never be proved, because we 
can never know what it is that makes deterrence in 
the end work. Deterrence presupposes a close 
interrelationship between deterrer and adversary. It 
involves a responsive element and hence is a 
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subjective mental process. No transcendent arbiter 
is therefore available that could allow us to judge 
objectively the exact requirements for deterrence to 
function within the change of increasingly complex 
times and the uneasy prospects for nuclear 
weapons proliferation. All perceptions of 
deterrence relations are contingent and hence 
exposed to the possibility of misinterpretation and 
the concomitant failure then to engage in dialogue. 
In addition, the alleged benefits of deterrence are 
based on the morally reprehensible threat to use 
weapons, and thus make the very idea of nuclear 
peace questionable and pernicious. The risk of 
deterrence failing, however, grows with extending 
time spans into the future. This, again, suggests 
the necessity for the elimination of weapons of 
mass destruction. But, because of the availability of 
nuclear weapons in principle, such a task can 
never be totally and confidently achieved. Can our 
ethical sensibility develop and overcome this 
unbearable aporia, this tragic dilemma? 
[n general, a rule of action can be adequately 
judged only in relation to the motivation which 
underlies and directs the action. And motivation 
itself must be determined through the principle of 
neutrality or impartiality in order to enable it to 
include the other into the self. Thereby alone does 
it lay the ground for truly reciprocal or 
interconnected relations between and among 
agents. For where there is no dialectically formed 
relation - in the sense that actors become 
conscious of being mutually dependent upon one 
another socially and historically - there is only 
dichotomy and fragmentation. But, given the 
specific reference to the nuclear age, our 
reflections on motivation must now also consider 
the implications and consequences of the action of 
particular agents not only in relation to one another 
but likewise in relation to mankind as a whole. This 
part-whole relationship establishes from within its 
natural and socio-historically mediated organic 
structure an a priori rule for perspectival thinking. 
That is to say, the motivation that informs the 
external morality of individual state agents and their 
self-interest must transform itself into the ethical 
consciousness of internal world relations. 
This categorical imperative in the nuclear age, 
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then, involves an irreversible Gestalt shift in our 
paradigmatic thinking from centre to context. The 
context itself is intended by usually state-centric 
policy considerations that now should go beyond 
the boundaries of self-interest. How this context 
appears to the consciousness of agents is the 
subject of phenomenology. There cannot be 
mutually binding ethical norms without a reasoned 
awareness of their absolute contextual 
conditioning. [n this sense, planetary goals need to 
be fused into the political. decisions of those 
present and future states that boast of nuclear 
weapons capabilities. Political purposes which in 
their reach encompass all of humanity are 
accordinglY not only morally right but ethically 
necessary. And this is so because when a particular 
mode of thinking has reached its own limits, it is 
dialectically driven to transcend itself and reflect on 
wider horizons from which it first of all derives its 
meaning. This thinking, however, is never an 
isolated act; it is always socially mediated and, 
hence, dialectical. We have to realise, for instance, 
that the right of a state to defend itself is not 
unlimited. After all, the plurality of states has 
emerged historically. But it is this history for 
whose continuity the society of states is now 
teleologically responsible. It is the call of history, as 
it were, to which we must purposefully respond. 
The experience of the twentieth century has 
tragically and in many different ways taught us that 
the idea that one can change the world according 
to a theory of what ought to be has become 
unpracticable and hideously dangerous. However, 
in the light of the availability of nuclear weapons, 
one project as the good for humankind needs to be 
kept alive: situations should be created in which 
people are not harmed on the basis of these 
situations. This is not a utopia since no fulfilled life 
is promised; nor does it envisage a futu~e where 
there would no longer be any evil, privation, and 
conflict. The existence of nuclear weapons thus 
leads to a change in consciousness away from 
naive and rather emotion-laden ethical precepts to 
realistic but more enlightened reflections on the 
ever-present possibility that we turn reason against 
ourselves. We have to balance with one another 
what is possible, feasible, and desirable. 
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Nuclear weapons use forces which are of a 
cosmic and not planetary nature. Such forces 
compel us to consider that what has become 
theoretically possible is never actually to happen. 
We now live under conditions which can be 
compared to a self-destructive mechanism in the 
sense that this mechanism operates according to 
laws which are not established by man and which 
cannot be controlled by man. What allows mankind 
to destroy itself is that which as a cosmic process 
makes life on earth possible in the first place. With 
a nuclear war human rationality eliminates the very 
basis of its life. 
It is difficult to believe that the bombs which 
were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki will 
remain the only ones ever to have been used in the 
whole history of mankind. This means that the 
possibility of the self-destruction of mankind can 
never be ruled out or its probability totally 
eliminated. Hence, there is no alternative to trying 
with as much institutional reliance as possible to 
regulate the weapon most carefully and to do so 
from generation to generation - and.this for ever. 
The motivation to:install and use nuclear weapons 
must be regarded as always latent. There will never 
be a guarantee that the destructive possibilities of 
these weapons will not one day be released from 
rational control. But should this ever happen, it will 
then have happened because the automatic 
feedback loop of technological innovation and 
computerised weapons systems wilI' have relegated 
the human factor to obsolescence and the human 
sovereignty of reason to a science which does not 
think. 
The natural law of nuclear weapons and the 
dialectical or social development of human history 
follow unchangeable patterns whatever their 
specific content of social life at any·given time or 
place. But whatever the historically differentiated 
and sophisticated self-descriptions of man may be, 
nature in the end is indifferent to all such forms of 
rationalisations. Natural law ultimately subsumes 
human history under it, it is the ultimate 
determinant of life on earth. It therefore teaches us 
in no uncertain terms that in the evt;nt of a nuclear 
war nature would withdraw the highest product 
from its evolutionary process. To argue, as some 
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do, that it only might do that as a possibility and 
that we have no means of gauging its necessity is 
the prerogative of cynics alone and oflazy and 
myopic thinkers. It does not reflect intellectual 
circumspection. Nor does it demonstrate political 
wisdom and an attentiveness to the dangerous risks 
we create with weapons of mass destruction. 
Secular life .is small in comparison with the 
cosmic dimensions around us. But even though 
conscious life in the universe is marginal and 
peripheral from our planetary point of view , it is 
necessarily connected to the inner meaning of its 
transitory and contingent existence. It is the 
confrontation with contingency that makes human 
action at all possible. This immanent relationship 
suggests that though life on earth will disappear it 
is for that reason not ephemeral. Its essentiality lies 
precisely in this contingency which alone makes 
human life authentic. If everything were already 
created to perfection, there would be no need for 
purposeful action, either horizontally, that is, in 
relation to other individuals, nor vertically in 
relation to our generic source in socially and 
historically grown humanity. In other words, 
contingency is the necessary precondition for there 
to be essential life. Cosmic law is the condition for 
the emergence of human and conscious life. Not 
only is human life by cosmic standards finite, such 
a finality mankind can also inflict upon itself. 
But do we have to engage in such nihilistic 
action only because we know of the finality of 
human life? Do we have to destroy humanity only 
because it will disappear anyway? How can we 
care for a life that will fade away sometime in the 
far future through natural forces or much earlier 
by human fiat? Only an education that leads us out 
of the insistence on parochial interests and 
motivates us into a holistic perspective of life on 
earth can help heal the wound of severed 
consciousness and create the conditions of 
circumspective peace with dignity and worthy of 
respect. This education must be of a philosophical 
nature if the quest for the truth of thinking as the 
human summum bonum is to be upheld and 
protected. And moreover, such an education is to 
accompany every new generation and become part 
of its learning of how to live with its natural and 
human environment without ever intending or 
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wanting to cause the evil of their ruin. 
It is the change of attitude from part to whole, 
from individual to mankind, that initiates new 
forms of moral and ethical consciousness. Not 
only must we become familiar with the dialectical 
or interrelated structure of socio-historical 
phenomena as I have tried to teach in my book. We 
must also be willing to understand these relations in 
such a way that our cognition of them can be 
integrated into our policies that are to guide the 
destiny of mankind. For there can be no moral 
conduct of individual and state agents in the 
nuclear age without an awareness of an ethics in 
global contexts. It is the perennial task of 
philosophy to comprehend these connections and 
to explain their eternal meaning for our actions 
beyond the time of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
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